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Abstract—Conventional blockchain implementations with
append-only semantics do not support deleting or overwriting
data in confirmed blocks. However, many industry-relevant use
cases require the ability to delete data, especially when personally
identifiable information is stored or when data growth has to be
constrained. Existing attempts to reconcile these contradictions
compromise on core qualities of the blockchain paradigm, as they
include backdoor-like approaches such as central authorities with
elevated rights or usage of specialized chameleon hash algorithms
in chaining of the blocks. In this technical report, we outline a
novel architecture for the blockchain ledger and consensus, which
uses a tree of context chains with simultaneous validity. A context
chain captures the transactions of a closed group of entities and
persons, thus structuring blocks in a precisely defined way. The
resulting context isolation enables consensus-steered deletion of
an entire context without side effects to other contextes. This
architecture opens the possibility of truncation, data rollover
and separation of concerns, and can help to fulfill the GDPR
regulations.
Index Terms—DLT, distributed ledgers, blockchain, deletion,
erasability, truncation, rollover, personally identifiable informa-
tion, PII, GDPR, consensus protocols, WORM, append-only
storage, decentralization
I. INTRODUCTION
Most blockchains and distributed ledgers follow an append-
only, write-once read-many (WORM) approach to ensure
auditability and trustworthiness. This pattern means that the
inability to delete deters the adaption of these implementations,
especially where law-mandated removal of person-related data
is obligatory. Additionally, the append-only semantics imply
that blockchain length and data size grow continously, which
makes a long-term blockchain usage problematic. The latter
concern is partially addressed in some scenarios by minimizing
the amount of ledger-stored data: for example, some applica-
tions choose to only store hashes (fingerprints) of the data
on-chain - yet such a restriction reduces the utility of a shared
ledger. Consequently, the adoption of the distributed ledger
technology (DLT) and specifically of blockchains is hindered
by an inflexible approach to auditability.
The mantra of “data cannot be deleted from the blockchain”
is not a requirement that must be implemented at any cost. It
is rather the consequence of cryptographic chaining of blocks,
which itself is an implementation pattern chosen to fulfill the
requirements of tamper-awareness (through integrity checks)
and a decision made in the early blockchain implementations.
In this report, we argue that deletion should be possible in a
distributed ledger (blockchain), but it should be a consensus-
based action and it must remove data in a way that does not
compromise the integrity of other blocks and their data. The
contribution of this report is therefore a tree-based structure to
store the ledger, which groups transactions based on business
contextes and into a linear subchain within the ledger tree
where all subchains are valid at the same time. This design
leads to an implementation where linear subchains can be
deleted without affecting the other subchains, and such dele-
tion is decided and agreed in a consensual way.
The benefit of the proposed approach is that it maintains
the important qualities of the blockchain paradigm (decen-
tralization and tracability of decisions, through use of asym-
metric cryptography to ensure the integrity of data, etc.)
while relaxing the restrictions which are heavy obstacles to
the applicability of the blockchains. It is important that this
approach is different from forking (as e.g. in Ethereum) and
also different from “backdoor”-based approaches such as those
relying on so-called chameleon hashes. Another advantage of
the proposed solution is that it fits well into permissioned
blockchains, but can also be used in permissionless solutions.
From the business perspective, it supports such commonplace
scenarios as year-end closings (where balances are computed
so that detailed logs can be archived) and also general trun-
cation/balancing. At the same time, the proposed approach
does not allow the deletion (or overwriting) of arbitrary
blocks and transactions, so that the auditability promise of the
blockchain remains in place. The remainder of the report is
structured as follows: Sec. II presents our contribution, Sec. III
describes how we plan to evaluate our approach and Sec. IV
concludes by outlining future work and current limitations of
the presented approach.
II. ENABLING DELETION IN BLOCKCHAINS AND
DISTRIBUTED LEDGERS WITH CHAINING
To explain our approach, consider a scenario of a con-
ventional shared and decentralized, distributed linear ledger
Llin with chained blocks of transactions. First, recall that a
blockchain transaction can refer to one, two or more entities
that can be PII (e.g. names or addresses). A simple state-
ment about a person (when a blockchain would be used for
identity management) may refer to only one PII entry. But in
Ethereum, for example, while a simple transaction can only
send Ether from one address to one address, the definition of
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Fig. 1. Llin: conventional blockchain: transactions with different context scopes
an Ethereum smart contract (which is created through a special
transaction) can refer to more than two hardcoded Ethereum
addresses of entities (for example, the definition of a contract
that implements a multisignature wallet). Also, an Ethereum
smart contract can have more than two input parameters
which accept Ethereum addresses (or other types that can
be of PII significance), with input values that change from
invocation to invocation. Overall, a transaction in Ethereum
can refer to more than two persons or organizations, and other
blockchain/ledger implementations have similar properties.
For explanation and illustration purposes, we start with the
following initial simplifications:
• we assume that the blockchain network is operated in a
permissioned way by a set of authorities (“organizations”,
borrowing the terminology from Hyperledger Fabric)
• we start out with only two blockchain-participating orga-
nizations Orgx and Orgy , and each of them runs at least
one blockchain node with a replica of the ledger; both
organizations participate in the consensus
• we assume that the resulting blockchain contains trans-
actions about only two physical persons pa and pb
In total, the transactions on this blockchain can include
statements about any combination of {Orgx, Orgy, pa, pb}
including the empty set, for a max. of 24 = 16 combinations.
Fig. 1 shows an example contents of Llin with above
setup. For illustration purposes, each block contains only one
transaction; hashes and other block contents are not shown.
Note how this linear chain mixes transactions that concern pa
and/or pb with transactions which concern Orgx and/or Orgy
or a mix of organization(s) and person(s). Clearly, if pa would
request to have pa’s data deleted from Llin (no matter whether
an individual transaction(s) or all of them), this deletion would
either invalidate Llin (by breaking the chaining if only some
blocks/transaction are deleted), or require the entire Llin to be
deleted as such, incl. transactions without reference to pa.
Even in products where a non-linear ledger structure is used
(such as the Tangle [1] DAG of IOTA), the remaining under-
lying problem is the unstructured placement of transactions.
The core solution aspect of the approach that we propose is a
structured placement of the transactions.
Thus, instead of linear chaining as in Fig. 1, consider our
proposed new approach as illustrated by Lnew in Fig. 2:
anchored at the “global” root (usually containing a genesis
block), we create a set of sub-chains with each having a sub-
anchor (Scope00 through Scope15 for the above example)
which defines each subchain’s scope. Continuing with the
above example, the resulting DAG (directed acyclic graph)
forms a tree with up to 16 well-defined branches - where all the
branches are valid at the same time. In Fig. 2, all transactions
from Fig. 1 have been placed into the appropriate sub-chain,
following the scope descriptor in the sub-root. Transaction
placement is based on precise scope match. For example, a
transaction with the scope {Orgx, pa} may only be placed
under Scope06, but not under Scope11, Scope13 or Scope15.
Note that for illustration purposes, all sub-roots in Fig. 2
have been created - even for branches where no transactions
have been assigned to yet; to save space and computational
efforts, creation of a sub-branch should be delayed up to the
moment where a first transaction/block need to be added to that
branch. In general, the upper bound for the possible number
of branches (given k organizations and m persons) is
(k+m)∑
i=0
(
(k +m)
i
)
= 2(k+m)
We believe that only a small fraction of branches (well
below the upper bound of 2(k+m)) indeed be created, and the
storage/runtime overhead of the subroots is not a showstopper.
Smart contracts (also stored on-chain) can be handled
similarly to transactions that change the state of assets: smart
contracts with source code whose declaration does reference
PIIs (e.g. the identity/address of the smart contract owner in
Ethereum) are stored in the corresponding context chain. Smart
contracts whose source code do not contain any reference to
PII can be stored in the context chain with the ∅ qualifier (see
Scope00 in Fig. 2). Note that it would be possible to arrange
the roots of the context chains in several layers, rather than in
one. However, this appears not to yield any space savings -
but brings higher complexity as searching for the context root
has to go beyond the “first layer”.
Now, if person pa requests all of her data to be removed
from Lnew, this affects several branches; we first discuss how
the request-affected branches are identified and addressed.
Branches with the scopes not including pa at all are not
affected (there are 8 of them). Removing branch with the
trivial Scope03 ({pa}) does not have side effects on any other
branches, and does not concern the node-runners Orgx or
Orgy . However, for the remaining 16-8-1=7 branches, the
deletion of transactions would affect other party/parties, and it
is the consensus principle that is essential here: a transaction
cannot be deleted unilaterily or in an unjustified way, i.e.
against the rights and obligations of other concerned parties.
For example, as the transaction in block B1 describes pa’s
transfer to pb, the blockchain operation should not permit pa
to unilaterally have B1 deleted, unless pb agrees.
Therefore, a deletion consensus is required in general, for
all affected branches. For deleting the branches with the scopes
{Orgx, pa} and {Orgy, pa}, the consensus-finding appears
rather straightforward: organizations Orgx and Orgy check
if they have any rightful business interest to the transactions
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Fig. 2. Lnew: non-linear blockchain, transactions with the same context scope are located in the same branch (subtree); subtrees are arranged in clockwise
manner; subroots shown in grey are not needed and should only be created on-demand once blocks with corresponding transactions are mined
stored in those branches, and they can object to the deletion,
preventing consensus.
The consensus rules must thus exhibit the following “all-
must-agree” behaviour:
1) all organizations that are part of the scope have to be
asked to agree and have to respond
2) any organization that is part of the scope has the right to
veto
3) any organization that is part of the scope that does not
respond (to the transaction/branch deletion request) is
considered to have issued a veto
However, neither pa nor pb are organizations, and they
do not operate nodes in this example. Thus, it is up to
the consensus-participating Orgx and Orgy to execute the
consensus, even if they are not in the scope of the transactions.
It is thus necessary to design a “guardian mechanism” which
ensures that the rights of an in-scope person (pb’s in the above
example) are properly represented during deletion requests.
In reality, blockchain-using applications tend not to permit
all end users to act directly on blockchain. Instead, organiza-
tions form blockchain business networks and transact together,
representing people and application end users in varying ways.
In particular, blockchain-using applications act on behalf of
the end user (“customer” person) and the end user does not
have insight into the blockchain-level data or code (smart
contracts).
In enterprise-grade blockchains such as Hyperledger Fabric,
a person which is subject of a transaction (such as pa in
the case of the transaction in B1) is not required to be
part of any organization, and can be represented in many
ways, for example as UUIDs, multi-field identifiers, DIDs
(see below) etc. - consequently, the same person can be
represented through different identifiers. Even in blockchain
implementations that do not have concepts of organizations
and which are geared towards participating individuals (as it
is the case in unpermissioned Ethereum), a transaction about
a person may not need involvement from that person.
We see different designs for identifying the potential “en-
dorsers” of the deletion consensus, and for setting the “en-
dorsement policy”. For a given branch with the scope Sg ,
potential endorsers may be chosen based on these options:
1) all organizations that have endorsed the transactions that
are included in Sg (minus endorsers which have since left
the blockchain network), or
2) all organizations in the scope Sg , plus organizations
which are named guardians of the persons in the scope
Sg , or
3) all (any) organizations within the blockchain network
Possible endorsing policy in every of these three cases should
be “all potential endorsers”, but depending on whether time-
outs are supported in a given blockchain product and on how
reliable the network is, a more flexible policy may be chosen,
resulting in “no response after timeout X means agreement”
implementation rather than in “no response means veto”.
Removing data from a context chain does not mean that
the sub-root must be removed as well: it can remain in-place
(keeping the scope definition in place) unless the requesting
person insists on having her “presence” in the ledger removed
as well (comparable to “delete account”).
It is clear that after a deletion has been agreed, each
ledger-holding blockchain network participant must replicate
the deletion on its side (including logs and backups), and
DevOps/corporate security measures must be in place to
prevent unauthorized copying of data.
As stated above, a transaction is sorted into a context chain
based on the declaration of its scope: a set of identifiers
for persons and for organizations which are directly affected
by that transaction. To ensure that the context is identically
understood by all network participants and by the software on
their nodes, we argue that the context should be made explicit
by the transaction submitter, and should not have to be derived
by the transaction validators, let alone by the ledger storage
module. The identifiers to be used may vary depending on the
specific ledger implementation, but we believe that the usage
4of DIDs (Decentralized Identifiers [2], a W3C standard) may
be beneficial when referencing humans or organizations.
DIDs are primarilty used by Self-Sovereign Identity solu-
tions (e.g. Sovrin [3] SSI), many of which use a ledger (e.g.
Hyperledger Indy [4]) to store fingerprints (hashes) of Verifi-
able Credentials [5]. DIDs are used both for clients (identity
holders) and service providers (incl. organizations). In SSI,
the user remains in control over which data (incl. assertions
and entitlements) is passed to which service provider - but the
user is also solely responsible for safeguarding her identity
information and doing backups. Most SSI offerings use a
mobile device as biometrically-secured storage for identity
information. As stated above, the identifiers within the context
of the proposed context chain should be sorted for efficiency
reasons; DIDs are simple three-section strings that can be
sorted easily.
Thus, the general ledger technology with our erasability
feature and the SSI approach can converge from two sides:
• general ledger technology can refer to a represenation
for persons and organizations that is vendor-independent,
privacy-oriented and supported by an increasing number
of tools (wallets, identity provider frameworks etc.)
• SSI technology can choose to store/exchange (enrypted)
Verifiable Credentials on-ledger if deletion is enabled,
since GDPR compliance is no longer out of reach
III. EVALUATION
To implement the context chains and the consensus-based
deletion, we have considered additions/modifications to the
open source code of Hyperledger Fabric and Ethereum (geth).
We believe that the presented concepts of context chains and
deletion consensus are rather clear, even though a peer review
of the concept is necessary before it can be refined and
implemented. Likewise, we believe such an implementation
should be preceded by a structured “request for comments”
workflow, for example by creating an ERC (Ethereum Request
for Comment) [6]. Therefore, this report and a detailed follow-
up publication (under preparation) serve as the scientific
foundation for such an ERC.
From the efficiency perspective, the additional complexity
and space requirements of our approach will have an impact
on the performance of blockchain operations. However, we
also believe that long-term benefit of erasability (especially
lower storage demands) will outweigh the runtime overhead
associated with context evaluation and with deletion consen-
sus. In particular, if application architecture can store shared
sensitive/PII data (which was previously confined to off-chain
storage and off-ledger data distribution) on-chain, the overall
complexity and resource overhead may decrease. This would
work best in ledger which have mechanisms for selective data
distributions (e.g. channels or the “need-to-know” principle).
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this report, we have presented a novel solution for adding
deletion capabilities to append-only (WORM) blockchains:
using the “context chain” architecture pattern, a separation
of concerns leads to a non-linear ledger structure with an ac-
companying, clear rules of transaction placing. Context chains
are complemented by consensus-driven decision making for
deletion, ensuring that deletion is not endangering auditability
and trustworthiness of the decentralized blockchain/ledger.
We have discussed different aspects of the deletion problem,
including ledgers that do not use chaining, non-cooperating
(or absent) network participants and the effects of non-
absolute majorities on the erasability of data. The oppor-
tunities that are unlocked by the ability to delete data in
append-only blockchains include space savings, accordance
with GDPR rules, and support of business processes such as
rollover/balancing and truncation.
For future work, we are already working on the
• analysis of sidechains and state channels (regarding dele-
tion, pruning, GDPR compliance and branching)
• analysis of further attempts to provide erasability (e.g.
through chameleon hashes [7])
• applicability to non-linear ledgers such as R3 Corda [8]
• truncation of suffixes and prefixes for a given ledger, as
well as the special case of dangling (unconfirmed) blocks
• applicability of our concept to permissionless and
organization-less ledgers, and to ledgers where a new
block must confirm more than one previous block
As part of our work, we plan pursue context chain imple-
mentation for a major enterprise-grade DLT implementation
such as Hyperledger Fabric, R3 Corda or Quorum (permis-
sioned Ethereum), since these open-source products do not
provide facilities to delete transactions or blocks. Likewise,
we plan to address erasability in ledgers which are used
as foundations for self-sovereign identity, such as Sovrin’s
Plenum/Indy ledger ( [3] / [4]). Finally, we plan to measure
the performance and scalability of deletion, including the
consensus phase.
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